Invasion of cooperators in lattice populations: linear and non-linear public good games.
A generalized version of the N-person volunteer's dilemma (NVD) Game has been suggested recently for illustrating the problem of N-person social dilemmas. Using standard replicator dynamics it can be shown that coexistence of cooperators and defectors is typical in this model. However, the question of how a rare mutant cooperator could invade a population of defectors is still open. Here we examined the dynamics of individual based stochastic models of the NVD. We analyze the dynamics in well-mixed and viscous populations. We show in both cases that coexistence between cooperators and defectors is possible; moreover, spatial aggregation of types in viscous populations can easily lead to pure cooperation. Furthermore we analyze the invasion of cooperators in populations consisting predominantly of defectors. In accordance with analytical results, in deterministic systems, we found the invasion of cooperators successful in the well-mixed case only if their initial concentration was higher than a critical threshold, defined by the replicator dynamics of the NVD. In the viscous case, however, not the initial concentration but the initial number determines the success of invasion. We show that even a single mutant cooperator can invade with a high probability, because the local density of aggregated cooperators exceeds the threshold defined by the game. Comparing the results to models using different benefit functions (linear or sigmoid), we show that the role of the benefit function is much more important in the well-mixed than in the viscous case.